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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, plea bargaining has spread beyond the countries 
where it originated—the United States and other common law jurisdictions—and 
has become a global phenomenon.1 Plea bargaining is spreading rapidly to civil 
law countries that previously viewed the practice with skepticism. And it has 
now arrived at international criminal courts.2 
While domestic plea bargaining is often limited to non-violent crimes,3 the 
international courts allow sentence negotiations for even the most heinous 
offenses, including genocide and crimes against humanity.4 Its use remains 
highly controversial, and debates about plea bargaining in international courts 
continue in court opinions and academic commentary: is it appropriate to offer 
 
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. This article is an adapted version of Plea Bargaining, 
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Fausto Pocar & Linda Carter eds., 2013). The chapter and article 
also draw on my previous work in JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS (2009) 
and my collaboration with Thomas Weigend on Negotiated Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES AND RULES (Göran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013). I thank Linda Carter for inviting me to take part in the 
Symposium and for her helpful edits on the earlier version of this piece. 
1. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35 (Fausto Pocar 
& Linda Carter eds., 2013). 
2. Id. 
3. JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 28 (2009) (Civil law countries are 
more likely to limit plea bargaining to non-violent crimes, although a few states in the United States have also 
imposed such restrictions). 
4. Turner, supra note 1, at 35. 
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sentencing concessions to a defendant who pleads guilty to a heinous crime 
involving thousands of victims? How can the avoidance of a public trial be 
reconciled with some of the professed goals of international criminal law, 
including the goal of creating a more accurate historical record of the atrocities 
and that of providing victims with a voice in the process? Conversely, given the 
very limited resources and enforcement powers of international criminal courts, 
could these courts achieve any of their goals effectively without the use of plea 
bargaining?5 
The guilty plea of Biljana Plavšić at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) illustrates some of the potential pitfalls of plea 
bargaining in international crimes cases.6 As co-president of the Serbian Republic 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Plavšić assisted in the campaign of ethnic cleansing 
against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, which resulted in the killing of more than 
50,000 non-Serbs and the expulsion of many more.7 She was indicted on two 
counts of genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity.8 In return for her 
guilty plea to persecution as a crime against humanity, prosecutors dropped both 
genocide counts and five of the lesser crimes against humanity counts and 
recommended a sentence of 15 to 25 years of imprisonment.9 Yet the Trial 
Chamber sentenced Plavšić to 11 years, noting that her guilty plea made a 
significant contribution to uncovering the truth about the crimes and promoting 
reconciliation in the region.10 The court’s leniency enraged Bosnian Muslims,11 
and their outrage was reignited when, just before her early release for “good 
behavior,” Plavšić publicly renounced her admission of guilt and stated that she 
had pleaded guilty simply to get a break in her sentence.12 
Plavšić’s case was by no means the only one in which international 
prosecutors offered to drop serious charges and recommend a more lenient 
sentence to obtain a defendant’s guilty plea.13 Nor was it the only one in which 
defendants offered statements of remorse and the court rewarded them with 
leniency, but their sincerity and effect on reconciliation remained in question.14 
Plavšić’s case was also one of several in which the defendant received significant 
 
5. Id. at 214. 
6. Turner, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
7. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 41 (ICTY Feb. 27, 2003) 
[hereinafter Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement]. 
8. Turner, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
9.  Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 7, at ¶5. 
10. Id. at ¶ 73. 
11. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 74 (2007). 
12. Olivera Simic, Bringing “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War Criminals, and the Interaction Between the 
Cosmopolitan and the Local, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1388, 1400 (2011). 
13. COMBS, supra note 11, at 74–76. 
14. Id. at 78, 84–85. 
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sentencing or charging reductions even though he or she did not cooperate with 
the prosecution in other cases.15 
Plavšić’s guilty plea—and others like it—may help explain why international 
criminal courts have not fully embraced plea bargaining. Indeed, ICTY judges 
have on several occasions refused to follow the parties’ sentence agreements and 
in some cases have attempted to place limits on charge bargaining.16 While 
judges have recognized the potential of plea bargaining to contribute to truth-
seeking and reconciliation (particularly when the defendant cooperates with the 
prosecution in other cases), they have also remained skeptical of guilty pleas that 
are rewarded for nothing more than their efficiency.17 
This skepticism is based in part on the unique features of international 
criminal justice, especially the horrific nature of the crimes prosecuted and the 
emphasis on uncovering the truth about these crimes.18 But the resistance to plea 
bargaining also relates to the blending of inquisitorial and adversarial approaches 
at the international courts.19 The inquisitorial tradition of full and independent 
judicial inquiry into the facts of the case, which has influenced the procedures of 
international courts, helps explain why plea bargaining continues to remain 
controversial in that setting.20 
This article highlights the different approaches to plea bargaining in civil 
law/inquisitorial and common law/adversarial systems and how the blending of 
these traditions has influenced plea bargaining at the international criminal 
courts. It ends with an overview of the debates concerning plea bargaining in 
international criminal procedure and some recommendations for making the 
practice more consistent with the goals of international criminal justice. 
II. PLEA BARGAINING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
A. Common Law Systems 
Plea bargaining has long been a staple of common law criminal justice 
systems.21 In the United States, plea bargaining was practiced as early as the mid-
19th century, and today more than 90% of convictions at the state and federal 
level result from guilty pleas.22 Australia, Canada, Nigeria, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom also use plea bargaining regularly.23 In the 
 
15. Id. at 74–76, 99, 103–06. 
16. Id. at 76–77, 81–83; TURNER, supra note 3, at 246. 
17. COMBS, supra note 11, at 77. 
18. TURNER, supra note 3. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Turner, supra note 1. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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typical common law plea bargain, the defendant agrees to plead guilty and 
perhaps cooperate with the prosecution in other cases in return for reduced 
charges or the prosecutor’s agreement to seek a lower sentence.24 
Plea bargaining holds two important advantages that help explain its 
dominance in common law systems and its recent spread to new jurisdictions.25 
First, it conserves resources by allowing the parties to negotiate the outcome of a 
criminal case and eliminating the need for a full trial.26 Second, in complex, 
multi-defendant cases, it helps prosecutors obtain critical insider information 
about criminal networks.27 As crime becomes more sophisticated and 
transnational, and as it taxes more of the criminal justice system’s resources, plea 
bargaining is increasingly seen as a tool for efficient and successful 
prosecutions.28 
Despite its rising popularity, plea bargaining remains controversial in the 
countries where it originated, and commentators continue to call for reform or 
outright abolition of the practice.29 Some are concerned that the plea discounts 
offered as part of bargaining are often so large that they could effectively coerce 
innocent defendants into pleading guilty.30 Others argue that the unduly generous 
concessions of plea bargaining are unfair to victims and undercut the deterrent 
effect of sanctions.31 Finally, plea bargains are criticized for interfering with the 
court’s ability to uncover the truth.32 
To reduce the dangers that a plea bargain may be unfair or factually 
inaccurate, common law jurisdictions introduced certain procedural safeguards.33 
For instance, in the United States, at the hearing where the defendant tenders a 
guilty plea, the court conducts an inquiry to ensure that the plea is voluntary, 
informed, and factually based.34 If the parties agreed that the prosecutor will 
merely recommend a sentence, then the court may accept or reject that 








30. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as a Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983). 
31. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) (currently 
known as CALIF. L. REV.); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 
(1987). 
32. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 31; Schulhofer, supra note 30. 
33. Turner, supra note 1. 
34. Id. 
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (c)(3)(B) (The court must, however, advise the defendant that he would 
not be able to withdraw his guilty plea if the court rejects the recommendation). 
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may reject the agreement if it is inconsistent with the interests of justice.36 In 
some common law jurisdictions, internal regulations also require prosecutors to 
consult with victims before entering into plea negotiations.37 
But these safeguards do not go far enough in addressing the various concerns 
about plea bargaining.38 Judges only become involved in the plea bargaining 
process after the negotiations have ended, by which time the parties have reached 
an agreement that they are unlikely to want to upset.39 They may conceal 
inconvenient details about the nature of the plea negotiations or even present 
facts about the case that are inaccurate.40 The court is unlikely to uncover these 
gaps and inaccuracies because it is almost entirely dependent on the parties for 
evidence in the case.41 It is also unlikely to spot inadequate representation 
because of the limited exposure to defense counsel when the case ends in a guilty 
plea.42 And since informed advice by counsel is critical to the defendant’s ability 
to tender a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the lack of oversight undermines 
the court’s ability to ensure that a guilty plea is genuine and factually justified.43 
Further, judges themselves are usually interested in expediting cases and often 
hold perfunctory hearings that fail to probe meaningfully into the facts of the 
case or the voluntariness of the guilty plea.44 
In the end, a strong case can be made that the procedural safeguards present 
in common law systems inadequately protect the fairness and accuracy of plea 
bargains.45 This helps explain why plea bargaining, despite its prevalence in 
common law systems, remains deeply controversial.46 
 
36. See, e.g., id. at 11(c)(3)(C); see also In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 711–12 (9th Cir. 2007); Virgin 
Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 375 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
37. Code for Crown Prosecutors—Draft for Public Consultation § 10.2 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/Code_for_Crown_Prosecutors_%20draft_%20for_public_consultation.pdf 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL § 9-16.030 (citing Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, P.L. 97-291, § 6, 96 Stat. 1256) 
(stating that United States Attorneys should make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider 
victims’ views about, any proposed or contemplated plea negotiations). 






44. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1611 (2005); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea 
Negotiation: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212–23 (2006). 
45. Turner, supra note 1. 
46. Id. 
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B. Civil Law Systems 
Until the 1980s, civil law jurisdictions generally regarded plea bargaining as 
inimical to their traditions of criminal procedure. Plea bargaining was seen as 
inconsistent with the principle of mandatory prosecution and with the duty of the 
court to investigate the facts of the case independently.47 The idea that the parties 
could resolve the case in an informal and consensual fashion starkly conflicted 
with the inquisitorial model of detailed judicial inquiry into the substantive 
truth.48 From a practical standpoint, the lack of juries and more limited defense 
rights also made plea bargaining less necessary.49 
Nonetheless, as civil law countries faced an increasing number of complex 
criminal cases and expanded defense rights, they also sought ways to conserve 
resources.50 Modified forms of plea bargaining have gradually come to be 
accepted.51 In Germany, practitioners and judges began informally negotiating 
cases in the 1980s, and the practice grew for several decades before it was 
formally authorized by legislation.52 In other countries, such as Italy, France, 
Russia, and Spain, the legislature took the initiative and introduced limited forms 
of plea bargaining as part of broader criminal procedure reforms.53 
Because of the tension between plea bargaining and the inquisitorial 
tradition, the type of bargaining introduced in civil law countries has been more 
restrained.54 The civil law variant of plea bargaining usually applies only to 
relatively minor, nonviolent crimes.55 Sentence reductions as part of a plea 
bargain are often capped, and concessions other than sentencing reductions, such 
as charge reductions or detention conditions, are typically prohibited.56 Like their 
common law counterparts, civil law systems require that an admission of guilt be 
voluntary, informed, and factually based.57 But civil law judges typically have 
better tools to ensure that this is the case.58 They are often involved in the 
negotiations between the parties and can examine the terms of the bargain before 
 
47. Id. 
48. See TURNER, supra note 3, at 75–76. 




53. E.g., id. at 73, 142 (discussing Germany and Russia); Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the 
Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 116 (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2012); Luca Marafioti, Italian Criminal 
Procedure: A System Caught Between Two Traditions, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 81 (Maximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008). 
54. Turner, supra note 1. 
55. Id. 
56. Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Thomas Weigend, Negotiated Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1401 (G⎯ran Slutter et al. eds, 2013). 
57. Turner, supra note 1, at 39. 
58. Id. 
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they are final.59 They have access to the entire investigative file in the case and 
can independently gather additional evidence if they have doubts about the facts 
underlying a plea agreement.60 More generally, they have greater authority to 
oversee plea agreements, including agreements about the charges.61 
Civil law systems also continue to favor confessions over guilty pleas.62 In 
contrast to guilty pleas, confessions are typically more detailed and do not 
eliminate the trial process entirely.63 Instead, courts receiving a confession are 
expected to continue the proceedings and review the evidence supporting the 
credibility of the confession.64 This is consistent with the traditional commitment 
of continental systems to uncovering the precise truth of the case.65 For the same 
reason, continental systems place a greater emphasis on ensuring that admissions 
of guilt rest on a solid factual basis.66 Some countries even expressly prohibit in 
their constitutions a conviction based solely on the suspect’s confession.67 In 
addition, civil law countries provide for broader disclosure of evidence to the 
defendant before plea negotiations begin, and many require that a defendant 
consult with counsel before pleading guilty.68 
In some civil law countries, victims’ rights are also considered in the plea 
bargaining scheme.69 Victims often take part in plea hearings, may be consulted 
before a court approves a plea agreement, and in some cases can veto a plea 
agreement.70 
Although plea bargaining is being increasingly adopted by civil law 
jurisdictions, the practice is not yet universal.71 A number of jurisdictions have 
opted for simplified trial procedures as an alternative or complement to plea 
bargaining.72 Others, such as Japan, encourage confessions tacitly, by regularly 




61. Id. at 1404; Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French 
Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 116, 128 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. 
Wade eds., 2012); Gwladys Gilliéron, The Risks of Summary Proceedings, Plea Bargains, and Penal Orders in 
Producing Wrongful Convictions in the U.S. and Europe, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE 237, 250 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2013). 
62. Turner, supra note 2, at 39. 
63. Id. 
64. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1402. 
65. Id. 
66. Turner, supra note 1, at 39. 
67. TURNER, supra note 3, at 273. 
68. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1402; TURNER, supra note 3, at 272. 
69. Turner, supra note 1, at 39. 
70. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1404 n. 191. 
71. Turner, supra note 1, at 40. 
72. TURNER, supra note 3, at Ch. 4 (discussing abbreviated procedures in China and Japan). 
73. TURNER, supra note 3, at 171–98; David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in THE JAPANESE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 140 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). Critics Hit 
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countries continue to regard plea bargaining with greater skepticism than their 
common law counterparts.74 This helps explain the somewhat more restrained 
form of plea bargaining adopted by international criminal courts, which combine 
features of both the civil law and common law models.75 
III. PLEA BARGAINING AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
A. The Introduction of Plea Bargaining 
As plea bargaining began spreading to an increasing number of domestic 
jurisdictions in the 1990s, it was perhaps not surprising that it ultimately made its 
way to international criminal courts.76 All such courts, with the exception of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, provide for the possibility of 
plea bargaining.77 But the introduction of plea bargaining was far from 
predetermined and remains controversial.78 In fact, three of the courts that allow 
plea bargaining in their statutes—the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon—have yet 
to resolve a case through plea bargaining.79 And the two major international 
tribunals to use plea bargaining extensively—ICTY and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—have not accepted a negotiated guilty 
plea since 2007.80 
 
Japan’s New Plea Bargaining System, Say It Opens Door to False Testimony, JAPAN TIMES (May 29, 2016), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/29/national/crime-legal/critics-hit-japans-new-plea-bargaining-
system-say-opens-door-false-testimony/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (Just this year, 
Japan adopted a limited version of plea bargaining, which allows prosecutors to reward defendants who provide 
information against other suspects). 
74. Turner, supra note 1, at 40. 
75. Id. 
76. Turner, supra note 1, at 41. 
77. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1395. 
78. Turner, supra note 1, at 41. 
79. Id. 
80. ICTY Annual Report 2007, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and 
%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2007_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2008, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20 
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2008_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2009, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20 
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2009_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2010, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and 
%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2010_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2011, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20 
and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2011_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (Although the ICTY and ICTR are in the process of completing their cases, this does not fully explain 
the lack of guilty pleas in the last five years. Since 2007, the ICTY has had 13 defendants who have moved into 
the pretrial stage and 20 more who were at different trial stages, but none of these defendants has pleaded 
guilty). 
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When the ICTY and ICTR were established in the early 1990s, neither their 
statutes nor their rules mentioned plea bargaining.81 The drafters of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure expressly rejected a proposal to allow offers of immunity to 
suspects who provide substantial cooperation to the prosecution.82 Both 
testimonial immunity and plea bargaining were seen as inappropriate in the 
context of international criminal prosecution.83 
Yet, the Statutes and Rules of the ICTY and ICTR did provide for guilty 
pleas, which was a stepping-stone to the introduction of plea bargaining.84 The 
ICTY received its first guilty plea in May 1996, when Dražen Erdemović pled 
guilty to crimes against humanity for participating in the killing of hundreds of 
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.85 His initial guilty plea was apparently not 
induced by prosecutorial promises of lenient treatment.86 But because he did not 
fully comprehend the consequences of his guilty plea, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber concluded that the plea was uninformed and therefore invalid.87 At the 
same time, in commenting on guilty pleas more broadly, the Appeals Chamber 
lauded the merits of plea bargaining and concluded that the practice could make a 
valuable contribution to international criminal justice.88 Reassured of the 
acceptability of plea bargaining at the ICTY, Erdemović and the prosecution 
reached a plea agreement under which Erdemović would plead guilty to the 
lesser offense of war crimes and the prosecution would recommend a lower 
sentence to the court.89 The ICTY found that Erdemović’s second guilty plea was 
sufficiently informed.90 
Once the ICTY Appeals Chamber displayed its approval of plea bargaining, 
the practice quickly gained a foothold.91 In 2000, Stevan Todorović entered a 
guilty plea that was the product of a negotiated plea agreement.92 Between 2001 
 
81. Turner, supra note 1, at 41. 
82. Judge Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, Statement Made at a Briefing to Members of 
Diplomatic Missions, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE ICTY 649, 
652 (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995). 
83. Turner, supra note 1, at 41. 
84. ICTY R. P. & EVID., 19, 20, IT/32/REV. 49 (22 May 2013) (stating that “the Trial Chamber shall read 
the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands 
the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a plea. . . . “ The original Rule 62, common to the ICTY and 
ICTR Rules of Procedure, also provided that defendants enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at their initial 
appearance). 
85. Turner, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
86. COMBS, supra note 11, at 60. 
87. Turner, supra note 1, at 42. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgement (ICTY Mar. 5, 1998) 
[hereinafter Erdemović, Sentencing Judgement]. 
91. Turner, supra note 1, at 42. 
92. Id. 
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and 2003, thirteen more defendants did the same.93 As of August 15, 2011, the 
ICTY convicted sixty-four defendants, twenty of whom pled guilty.94 The ICTR 
accepted its first guilty plea from Jean Kambanda in 1998.95 Between 1998 and 
August 2011, the tribunal convicted thirty-seven more defendants of international 
crimes, seven of whom pleaded guilty.96 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was signed in 1998, 
just about the same time that the international criminal tribunals began accepting 
their first guilty pleas.97 It provided for “proceedings on admission of guilt,” a 
term chosen over “guilty pleas” as a compromise between the civil law and 
common law traditions.98 Despite the different phrasing, the statute still allows 
negotiations between the defendant and the prosecution about the disposition of 
the case.99 Article 65(5) of the ICC Statute implicitly acknowledges the 
possibility of such negotiations by noting that “discussions” between the parties 
about the charges, the admission of guilt, or the sentence will not be binding on 
the court.100 
Although the ICC has yet to accept an admission of guilt, it is expecting to 
receive one in August, when Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi has said he would formally 
plead guilty to the war crime of “attacking buildings dedicated to religion and 
historic monuments.”101 Whether this guilty plea will remain an aberration or 
prompt a thriving practice of plea bargaining remains to be seen. Some authors 
have expressed skepticism that bargaining would take hold at the ICC, given the 
broad authority of the court to reject agreements between the parties.102 But 
 
93. Id. 
94. ICTY, KEY FIGURES OF ICTY CASES (May 20, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/sections/ 
TheCases/KeyFigures (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (The number of convicted 
defendants does not include those whose cases are being appealed). 
95. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 3 (Sept. 4, 1998) 
[hereinafter Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence]. 
96. See Status of Cases, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 
2011) (This number does not include a guilty plea by a former ICTR witness for giving false testimony to the 
Tribunal. Also, the number of convictions does not include seven convictions that are currently on appeal). 
97. Turner, supra note 1, at 42. 
98. Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2008). 
99. Turner, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
100. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(5), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9. 
101. Malian Jihadi To Plead Guilty in ICC Cultural Destruction Trial, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2016, 
8:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/may/24/malian-jihadi-to-plead-guilty-forgiveness-icc-
cultural-destruction-trial. 
102. See Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1390–91; Sergey Vasiliev, Ongwen at the ICC and the 
Possible ‘Guilty Plea’: A Response to Alex Whiting, POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://postconflictjustice.com/ongwen-at-the-icc-and-the-possible-guilty-plea-a-response-to-alex-whiting (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (expressing skepticism that a defendant such as Dominic 
Ongwen is likely to plead guilty, as well as broader concerns about the use of plea bargaining at the ICC). 
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others have argued that the court is not likely to be effective in accomplishing its 
goals unless it begins relying on plea bargains to some degree.103 
B. Conditions for Valid Plea Agreements 
At all international criminal courts, a plea agreement typically consists of 
some variation of the following exchange: the defendant admits guilt and waives 
various trial rights in exchange for a reduction of the sentence or the charges.104 
The negotiations occur between the parties, typically before trial, and judges are 
not involved.105 
The most common agreements concern sentencing, but agreements about the 
charges have also been reached a number of times at the ICTY and ICTR.106 
Charge bargains have been more controversial because of concerns that they may 
obscure the true facts of the case and the full extent of the defendant’s 
culpability.107 In a dissenting opinion, ICTY Judge Schomburg compared charge 
bargains to “de facto granting partial amnesty/impunity by the Prosecutor” and 
criticized them as conflicting with the Tribunals’ mission to avoid impunity, to 
establish the truth, and to promote peace and reconciliation.108 
The Tribunals’ mild skepticism toward charge bargains is consistent with the 
civil law approach to this issue.109 Charge bargains are typically disfavored in 
civil law systems.110 They are viewed as inconsistent with the rule of mandatory 
prosecution that still prevails in many civil law countries, as well as with the 
court’s duty to establish to truth of the case.111 Civil law judges usually have the 
authority to modify the charges brought by prosecutors, which undermines 
prosecutors’ ability to engage in charge bargains.112 
Tribunal judges do not have the same power to recharacterize the charges, 
but they have ample authority to restrain charge bargains in other ways.113 First, 
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and most obviously, plea agreements—including agreements concerning the 
charges—are not binding on the court.114 Second, after the pretrial chamber or 
judge initially confirms the charges, the prosecutor cannot unilaterally withdraw 
or alter them without the court’s consent.115 Finally, because judges at the 
international criminal courts have broad sentencing discretion, they can thwart a 
charge agreement by imposing a sentence that they believe is more 
commensurate with the defendant’s blameworthiness.116 For all these reasons, 
some have argued that charge bargains at the international criminal tribunals are 
not likely to be effective.117 
Bargaining at the ICTY and ICTR has also involved concessions other than, 
on the one hand, guilty pleas and, on the other, reductions of the sentence or 
charges. A common and well-accepted item of exchange is a commitment by the 
defendant to cooperate with the prosecution in other proceedings. Such 
cooperation is expressly envisioned as a mitigating factor by the ICTY and ICTR 
Rules pertaining to sentencing.118 Although the prosecution has great influence in 
ensuring that substantial cooperation will be credited by the court, international 
courts will assess the value of the cooperation independently and may depart 
from the prosecutor’s recommendations on the issue.119 This is consistent with 
the civil law influence on the Tribunals and with the greater responsibility and 
authority of judges to investigate and determine the facts of the case.120 
Other concessions that have been exchanged are not specifically authorized 
by the Tribunals’ Statutes or Rules. These include: withdrawal of defense 
motions,121 waivers of appeal,122 dropping certain factual allegations,123 
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recommendations as to imprisonment location,124 and promises not to refer a case 
to national authorities.125 Courts have not always been able to deliver on some of 
the prosecutorial promises on that list, which has led to skepticism among 
defendants about the usefulness and fairness of plea bargaining.126 
Plea agreements at the Tribunals must be in writing and must be disclosed to 
the court in a public session. At all three international criminal courts discussed 
here, agreements are not binding on the court.127 Instead, the court will review the 
agreements, to ensure that they are voluntary128 and fair129 and to verify that they 
are consistent with the “interests of justice,” including the interests of victims.130 
Placing the ultimate authority to review and approve the agreement with the court 
is consistent with both civil and common law approaches to plea bargaining. 
To ascertain whether an agreement is consistent with the interests of justice, 
international criminal courts may call victims to testify at the plea hearing or at 
the sentencing hearing following the guilty plea. The ICTY and ICTR have not 
relied on victim testimony when reviewing plea agreements, but the ICC Statute 
specifically allows the court to involve victims in the proceedings on admission 
of guilt.131 
When faced with an agreement that it believes may not be consistent with the 
interests of justice, an ICC trial chamber has two options. It may refer the case to 
proceed under the ordinary trial procedure.132 Alternatively, if it believes that “a 
more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of 
justice, in particular the interests of the victims, [it] may: (a) Request the 
Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of 
witnesses. . . .”133 This “additional evidence” procedure reduces the efficiency of 
plea bargaining, but it arguably helps protect the interests of the international 
community and of victims in compiling a detailed and accurate record of the 
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crimes. It also reflects the influence of the civil law approach, which emphasizes 
the duty of the court to fully investigate and document the facts of the case. 
C. Conditions for Valid Guilty Pleas 
In choosing to forego a trial, a defendant waives a number of other important 
rights—the right to be presumed innocent until guilt is established beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the 
right to compel witnesses to appear on his behalf, and the right to testify or to 
remain silent at trial. The decision to waive these rights is a momentous one, and 
the court must ensure that it is made freely and knowingly. 
At all international criminal courts, therefore, judges must examine the 
validity of guilty pleas. At the ICTY and ICTR, a guilty plea must be voluntary, 
informed, unequivocal, and based on sufficient factual basis to be accepted.134 At 
the ICC, the requirements are generally the same, with several notable exceptions 
discussed later in this article. The inquiry into the defendant’s admission of guilt 
to ensure that it is informed, voluntary, and factually based is consistent with 
both the civil law and common law approaches to this question. It also supports 
the Tribunals’ goals to provide fair trials and serve as a criminal procedure model 
for national systems. 
ICTY and ICTR case law has elaborated on the meaning of some of the 
requirements for a valid guilty plea. ICTY and ICTR Rules do not provide a 
definition of “voluntariness.”135 But in Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the Appeals 
Chamber explained that for a guilty plea to be voluntary, the accused must be 
“mentally fit to understand the consequences of pleading guilty” and must not be 
“affected by any threats, inducements or promises.”136A defendant is deemed to 
be mentally fit and competent to plead guilty when he is able “to participate in 
the proceedings (in some cases with assistance) and sufficiently exercise the 
identified rights, i.e. to make his or her defence.”137 Being “merely depressed 
over being isolated while in detention,” for example, is not sufficient to render a 
defendant incompetent to plead guilty.138 
In general, the threshold for an involuntary guilty plea cannot be met simply 
by pointing to ordinary pressures attendant to the criminal process. For example, 
when an ICTY trial chamber suggested to a defendant that it might reject his 
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guilty plea to lesser charges because it did not appear to be factually based, this 
did not render involuntary his subsequent guilty plea to more serious charges.139 
Similarly, a guilty plea was found voluntary even though the defendant was 
isolated in detention and consulted only with assigned defense counsel, rather 
than a counsel of his choice, before pleading guilty.140 The same ruling held that 
when the defendant pled guilty in the hope that he would avoid life 
imprisonment, but this was not explicitly stated in the plea agreement, and he 
was later sentenced to a life term by the court, the guilty plea was still 
voluntary.141 Finally, if a defendant affirms in the plea agreement or at the plea 
hearing that he is pleading guilty of his own free will, he will generally have 
difficulty later showing that his plea was coerced.142 
This raises the question whether international criminal courts will consider a 
guilty plea to be involuntary if it is submitted under the threat of a much more 
severe sentence upon conviction at trial. In common law systems such as the 
United States, such a scenario does not render a guilty plea involuntary.143 Yet in 
some civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, threats of a disproportionately 
harsher sentence upon conviction at trial would invalidate a subsequent 
admission of guilt.144 
Although both civil law and common law systems require that guilty pleas be 
voluntary, their definitions of voluntariness differ somewhat. Common law 
countries tend to treat defendants as autonomous agents who are able to decide 
for themselves whether to accept a particular plea bargain, even if the difference 
between a guilty plea and a conviction after trial is extraordinary. By contrast, 
civil law countries tend to take a more paternalistic approach and limit the types 
of bargains that can be offered to defendants. In Italy, France, Russia, and 
Germany, for example, plea bargains are limited (as a matter of law or practice) 
to relatively minor crimes carrying a lower sentence.145 A number of civil law 
 
139. Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, ¶¶ 8–12 (ICTY July 
18, 2005) [hereinafter Babić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal]. 
140. Kambanda, Judgement, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 57, 64. 
141. Id at ¶ 63. 
142. Babić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 8–12; Kambanda, Judgement, supra 
note 139, at ¶¶ 57, 64. 
143. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
144. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] GSSt 1/04, Mar. 3, 2005 (Ger.) (“It is unlawful 
to pressure the accused into a confession by threatening him with an inappropriately severe sentence or by 
promising him advantages not provided for by the law, to promise the accused a more lenient sentence in 
exchange for waiving his right to appeal. . . . “) [hereinafter BGH]; BGH 4 StR 84/04, Urteil v. 16.9.2004 (Ger.) 
(reversing judgment and ordering new trial of defendant who was threatened with pretrial detention if he 
refused to confess and persisted in filing motions to subpoena witnesses located abroad); BGH StR 411/04, 
Beschluss v. 12.1.2005 (Ger.) (holding that a proposed plea discount of about 50%, from a sentence of 6-7 years 
to a sentence of 3 years and 6 months, was unlawful, because it was an unwarranted reward for a confession and 
might unduly coerce a defendant into confessing); BGH StV 2004, 470 (5 StR 579/03) (Ger.) (holding that a 
two-thirds discount, from 6 years to 2 years, is unlawful because it may coerce a defendant to plead guilty). 
145. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1401; TURNER, supra note 3, at 75. 
2017 / Plea Bargaining and International Criminal Justice 
234 
countries also limit the sentencing discount that can be offered to induce 
defendants to waive their right to trial.146 So far, the international tribunals appear 
to have approached voluntariness along the lines of the common law model, but 
it is still possible that future international courts, particularly the ICC, will take 
the approach of civil law jurisdictions and view voluntariness as a more 
demanding requirement. 
One indication that the ICC may take this approach is that it already requires 
consultation with defense counsel to ensure that admissions of guilt are 
voluntary.147 No such requirement exists at the ICTY and ICTR or in common 
law jurisdictions, where defendants can waive their right to counsel before 
pleading guilty.148 Instead, the ICC approach is instead consistent with that of 
civil law jurisdictions, which limit the ability of defendants to represent 
themselves in certain cases where self-representation is unlikely to be in the 
defendants’ best interests.149 
For the guilty plea to be valid, it must also be informed. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has explained that this means that “the accused must understand the 
nature of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty to 
them.”150 The ICC statute uses similar language in describing the requirement.151 
As the ICTY has elaborated, the court must ensure that the defendant understands 
the key elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty152 and appreciates 
the differences between alternative charges.153 In Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber invalidated a guilty plea to crimes against humanity 
because the defendant had not been adequately informed that a crime against 
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humanity is a more serious crime than war crimes (with which he was also 
charged) and that it carries a more serious punishment.154 
The court must also ensure that the defendant understands the rights he is 
waiving by pleading guilty.155 As noted earlier, these include the right to require 
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt at a public trial, 
the right to prepare a defense against these charges, the right to be tried without 
undue delay, the right to confront adverse witnesses and obtain defense 
witnesses, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.156 It is now 
standard practice for plea agreements at the ICTY and ICTR to list the rights that 
defendants are waiving. 
The court must also confirm that the defendant understands that the 
agreement is not binding on the court, and that the defendant may receive a 
sentence up to the maximum available at the international criminal courts—life 
imprisonment. Trial chambers often do admonish defendants of these potential 
consequences, but have not done so consistently.157 If a defendant affirms that he 
understands the charges and the sentencing consequences of the charges, this is 
likely to be sufficient to show that the guilty plea is informed.158 
International courts have not addressed the question of whether the defendant 
must be given access to all evidence material to his defense before a guilty plea. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea may be 
informed even when the prosecution did not disclose evidence that could be used 
to impeach some of its witnesses.159 But in other common law jurisdictions, 
defendants receive such information,160 and in civil law jurisdictions, defendants 
receive all material evidence in the case against them before they have to make a 
decision whether to admit guilt and waive trial.161 
International criminal courts have generally required broader pre-plea 
disclosure by the prosecution, at least of exculpatory evidence and certain other 
evidence material to the defense. The courts’ rules already require the 
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prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence “as soon as practicable”162 and to 
allow the defense to inspect documents, books, and other tangible objects which 
are material to its case.163 At the ICC, Pre-Trial Chambers have gone further and 
demanded that the prosecution disclose at least the “bulk” and in some cases the 
“totality” of exculpatory evidence before the charges are confirmed.164 Although 
the international courts have not fully adopted the civil law approach of 
providing all evidence in the investigative file to defendants before they admit 
guilt, they have adopted relatively rigorous pre-plea disclosure rules, consistent 
with the goal of uncovering the truth and providing an accurate record of the 
crimes. 
The ICTY and ICTR have also adopted the requirement, imported from 
common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Malaysia, that the 
guilty plea must not be equivocal.165 As the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained, 
this means that the guilty plea “must not be accompanied by words amounting to 
a defense contradicting an admission of criminal responsibility.”166 In 
determining whether a plea is equivocal, the court may examine whether the plea 
was qualified by statements that appear to present a legal defense to the crime.167 
The court may specifically question the defendant as to his intention to raise any 
defenses, such as duress or insanity.168 This requirement is consistent with 
international human rights law and helps protect innocent defendants from 
pleading guilty.169 
The guilty plea must also rest on a sufficient factual basis. At the ICTY and 
ICTR, the court must verify that “there is a sufficient factual basis . . . either on 
the basis of independent indicia or on lack of any material disagreement between 
the parties about the facts of the case.”170 In other words, the court can establish 
factual basis resting solely on the parties’ agreement. This rule effectively allows 
the parties to engage in “fact bargaining,” whereby they could agree to a set of 
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facts different from the real facts of the case. In practice, trial chambers have 
usually conducted an independent inquiry into the facts and have required that 
evidence other than the parties’ agreement support the guilty plea.171 
Nonetheless, the ICTY and ICTR have recognized that a factual basis inquiry 
“do[es] not call for the same scrutiny of facts by a Chamber as in a trial situation 
where the Prosecutor has the usual burden of proof.”172 
At the ICC, the Statute provides that the factual basis for the plea cannot be 
based simply on an agreement between the parties about the facts. Instead, the 
court is expected to review the charging documents, the parties’ agreement, any 
materials presented by the prosecutor which supplement the charges and which 
the accused accepts, and any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, 
presented by the prosecutor or the accused.173 Judges may call on the prosecutor 
to present additional evidence if they believe “that a more complete presentation 
of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the 
interests of the victims.”174 
The ICC requirement that admissions of guilt be accompanied by a more 
complete presentation of the facts appears to be influenced by the civil law 
approach, which attaches great importance to uncovering the precise truth in 
criminal cases and creating an authoritative record of events.175 Although the 
more probing inquiry may undermine, to some degree, the efficiency of plea 
bargaining, it advances the court’s goal of revealing the truth about massive and 
systemic international crimes. Given the special significance of transparency and 
truth-seeking in international crimes cases, the ICC has arguably struck a more 
appropriate balance in this respect than its predecessor international courts. 
D. Sentencing Consequences of Guilty Pleas 
The international criminal courts’ rules and statutes make no mention of the 
sentencing consequences of a guilty plea. But judges have generally accepted that 
if plea bargaining is to continue, defendants must receive a more lenient sentence 
in return for admitting their guilt. In most plea-bargained cases, therefore, judges 
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followed the parties’ agreement and reduced the defendant’s sentence 
accordingly. 
Courts have not articulated a consistent justification for the sentence 
reductions awarded to defendants who plead guilty. At the domestic level, guilty 
pleas are typically rewarded because of their practical benefits in conserving 
resources of the criminal justice system. This rationale for crediting guilty pleas 
is also mentioned at the international level,176 but is not given as a primary reason 
for plea-related sentencing reductions.177 More frequently, guilty pleas are 
described as deserving of credit because they advance other key goals of 
international criminal courts: helping to establish the truth,178 encouraging other 
perpetrators to come forward and accept responsibility,179 and contributing to 
reconciliation in war-torn societies by showing the defendant’s remorse and 
contrition.180 It should be noted, however, that not all decisions have embraced 
each of these rationales for guilty pleas. Some courts have held that international 
courts should not be awarding sentencing reductions merely for efficiency 
purposes,181 that a guilty plea is not necessarily an indication of contrition,182 and 
that the contribution of guilty pleas to the discovery of the truth is not always 
positive.183 
ICTY and ICTR defendants who have pleaded guilty have received, on 
average, less than a 30% sentencing discount.184 This is smaller than the typical 
discount for guilty pleas in several major national legal systems.185 The 
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differential also varies from defendant to defendant, and it has increased over 
time. 
IV. THE DEBATE OVER PLEA BARGAINING AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS 
Plea bargaining remains more controversial and less common at the 
international level than at the national level. Several reasons account for the 
skepticism toward plea bargaining in international criminal courts. First, the 
granting of concessions to defendants accused of international crimes is 
perceived as unseemly given the heinousness and large scale of the crimes in 
question. Plea bargaining is seen to dilute the moral message that international 
courts aim to send—that the international community is outraged and will bring 
to justice those responsible for the crimes committed. Second, plea bargaining is 
viewed as interfering with the goal of uncovering the truth about international 
crimes. Finally, plea bargaining is said to disrespect victims’ interests in a public 
trial and in a sentence proportionate to the defendant’s blameworthiness. 
Advocates of the practice counter that plea bargaining is not inherently at odds 
with the goals of international criminal justice and, that if properly structured and 
administered, a limited form of plea bargaining may provide important benefits 
to international criminal courts. 
The merits of the first major objection to plea bargaining—that it is unfit to 
use in the heinous crimes that international courts handle—depends heavily on 
the steepness of the plea discount. If negotiations lead to a sentence of a mere 
few years imprisonment for a crime against humanity or genocide, the system 
will have failed. A sentence that is disproportionately low would conflict with the 
retributive goal of imposing on the offender the punishment he deserves and 
expressing commensurate outrage at his actions.186 Overly lenient dispositions 
resulting from plea bargains would also reduce the deterrent effect of 
international criminal justice, which depends on the swiftness, likelihood, and 
severity of punishment.187 International criminal courts already face difficulties 
on all three scores: they are neither swift nor very successful in apprehending and 
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prosecuting suspects, and their baseline sentences are, by many estimates, too 
low. Reducing these sentences further as part of plea bargaining dilutes a 
deterrent effect that is already in question. 
Plea bargains that result in sentences that are not excessively lenient, 
however, can at least increase the swiftness and the likelihood of punishment. 
One way they do so is by allowing prosecutors to obtain convictions in the face 
of evidentiary difficulties. International prosecutors encounter enormous 
challenges in gathering evidence. The crimes committed are often systemic, 
widespread, and complex. Investigations tend to take place in territories plagued 
by violent conflict or other security risks, and national authorities are often 
unwilling or unable to help ICC investigators. Witnesses, too, are frequently 
afraid to testify. Given these difficulties, prosecutors may legitimately prefer a 
plea bargain resulting in a lower sentence to the risk of an acquittal after trial of a 
defendant whom they believe to be guilty. Plea bargaining can also provide 
prosecutors with indispensable, inside knowledge that helps them succeed in 
other cases against more culpable, high-level offenders.188 
More broadly, plea bargaining frees up resources that can be used to 
prosecute a greater number of offenders. Given the high costs, complexity, and 
length of international trials, this is an important practical consideration. 
Although efficiency, in and of itself, is not ordinarily viewed as a point of 
emphasis in international criminal justice,189 it is a means to achieving the 
broader goal of punishing and deterring international crimes. The ICTY has 
expressly recognized this point: 
Substantial human and practical benefits flow from a plea of guilty, 
particularly one tendered at an early stage in the proceedings. Victims 
and witnesses who have already suffered enormous psychological and 
physical harm are not required to travel to the Hague to recount their 
experiences in court, and potentially re-live their trauma. In addition, 
scarce legal, judicial and financial resources that would otherwise be 
expended in preparing for and conducting a lengthy and expensive trial 
may be redeployed in the interests of securing the wider objectives of the 
Tribunal.190 
A recent study of the pace of ICTR and ICTY cases shows that cases 
resolved by guilty pleas take, on average, half as long as cases resolved by 
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trial.191 The International Criminal Court has recently been considering ways to 
expedite its proceedings, and plea bargaining can help accomplish that goal.192 
By freeing up resources to investigate and prosecute more defendants, plea 
bargaining increases the swiftness and likelihood of punishment. According to a 
number of studies, the likelihood and immediacy of punishment are in fact more 
influential deterrent factors than the severity of punishment.193 And although plea 
bargaining may result in more lenient, and thus, less proportionate punishments 
than full trials do, it ensures at least some level of retribution for a great number 
of persons who would otherwise evade punishment altogether.194 
A second major objection is that plea bargaining undermines the educative 
function of international criminal law. International criminal trials are said to 
serve the important purpose of reinforcing the rule of law. They send the message 
that atrocities, even when committed by those in power, will not be ignored and 
will be judged. Because of this emphasis on the rule of law, advocates of 
international criminal justice often find truth commissions or various civil or 
informal legal mechanisms of dealing with atrocities to be inadequate.195 Plea 
bargaining is similarly seen by some to dilute the moral message that 
international criminal courts send. 
It is true that bargaining does not offer the same educational effect as a trial. 
Its abbreviated inquiries into the facts and the lack of witness testimonies deprive 
the national and international communities of a powerful and dramatic reminder 
of the value of the rule of law. Nonetheless, by producing a conviction, a plea 
bargain still reinforces the basic notion that the rule of law reaches those most 
responsible for international crimes, even when they are high political and 
military leaders. And when formerly powerful leaders admit guilt before the 
Tribunals, they “send[] a powerful message about the legitimacy” of the tribunals 
and their functions.196 
International criminal courts have also stressed the importance of protecting 
the rights and interests of victims. This emphasis on victims’ interests likely 
reflects, at least in part, the influence of the civil law approach to criminal justice, 
in which victims have stronger rights of participation in criminal cases. But it is 
also influenced by human rights jurisprudence, which emphasizes the right of 
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victims of human rights atrocities to receive full judicial remedies for the wrongs 
done to them.197 
Trials at international courts are said to serve survivors of the crimes by 
helping them and their communities achieve a sense of closure. One author has 
called them “an enormous national psychodrama, psychotherapy on a nationwide 
scale.”198 Trials provide a forum for victims to tell their stories and to have the 
wrongs done to them formally acknowledged.199 Against this background, plea 
bargaining seems an unpalatable alternative from a victim’s perspective—it 
shortcuts the trial proceedings and the healing function they may provide for 
victims, and it reduces the punishment imposed on offenders.200 
But advocates of plea bargaining note that the tension between victims’ 
interests and plea bargaining is not always so strong. First, international criminal 
courts can allow victims to participate in plea hearings and express their views on 
proposed plea bargains. The ICC legal framework already includes some 
provisions allowing for greater victim participation at the proceedings on 
admission of guilt.201 Courts can also encourage the types of guilty pleas that are 
more likely to be valuable to victims—unequivocal, detailed, and accompanied 
by genuine and voluntary expressions of remorse.202 Moreover, at least in the 
eyes of some victims, avoiding trial testimony may be a benefit. A plea bargain 
spares these victims the inconvenience of traveling to another country to testify, 
the concern about their and their family’s safety, and the ordeal of facing the 
defendant, reliving the trauma they experienced, and possibly having their 
credibility questioned during cross-examination.203 Plea bargains also benefit all 
victims by ensuring a speedier completion of the proceedings and facilitating any 
compensation claims they may have, and thus allowing them to move forward 
with their lives.204 
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In addition to protecting victims’ interests, international criminal courts also 
aim to promote peace and reconciliation in the region where the crimes took 
place. This is a goal that is unique to criminal trials at the international level and 
was used to justify the creation of modern international criminal tribunals.205 By 
locating individual responsibility for crimes, international criminal trials aim to 
end accusations targeted at entire groups and thus break a cycle of conflict.206 
Proponents of plea bargaining argue that guilty pleas can also contribute to 
this goal of international criminal justice. When defendants plead guilty, they 
accept individual responsibility for their actions and help reveal the truth in 
relation to the crimes charged. By helping establish the truth, guilty pleas 
contribute to the healing and reconciliation process.207 The expression of remorse 
that typically accompanies a guilty plea also promotes reconciliation.208 As a 
witness commented on the guilty plea of Miroslav Deronjić, “The Bosnian 
Muslims in the community that I have spoken to, felt relieved because he 
admitted his guilt. This is a positive thing and can heal the wounds of the 
community provided that he is punished adequately.”209 
But the effect of guilty pleas on reconciliation is not straightforward. When 
pleas are accompanied by significant sentencing discounts, they are controversial 
among victims and often stir further resentment rather than reconciliation.210 
Even when accompanied by statements of remorse, such guilty pleas are often 
seen as disingenuous and motivated purely by the sentencing reductions. For 
guilty pleas to have a positive effect on reconciliation, they may have to be 
accompanied by remorseful actions, not just by mere statements, in order to 
receive a sizable sentencing discount. Courts may choose to grant such 
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sentencing reductions only when the defendant has taken reparative steps beyond 
a guilty plea—by surrendering voluntarily, cooperating with the prosecution in 
other cases, revealing information beyond that already known to the prosecution, 
or taking other conciliatory actions toward victims.211 International courts may 
also have to conduct more active outreach work in victim communities to explain 
the justifications for plea bargains.212 
International criminal courts have also committed to providing fair trials and 
following procedures that can serve as a model for criminal justice systems 
around the world. Advocates of plea bargaining argue that the practice is 
consistent with international human rights law because of the procedural 
safeguards that international courts have introduced to ensure that a guilty plea is 
voluntary, informed, and factually based.213 Critics counter that courts have not 
sufficiently addressed the problem that guilty pleas may be coerced through 
excessive sentencing discounts and that defendants do not always receive 
sufficient information to waive their rights to trial knowingly and intelligently.214 
Defendants may also suffer unfairness when they plead guilty with the 
expectation of receiving a sentence reduction, but the court refuses to follow the 
parties’ agreement as to the sentence.215 Since the court is not bound by the 
agreement, a defendant who pleads guilty is effectively throwing himself at the 
mercy of the judges. And although defendants receive notice before they plead 
guilty, that the agreement is not binding on the court, this does not entirely 
eliminate the underlying fairness concern. 
Finally, plea bargaining has a complicated relationship to the goal of 
establishing an accurate record of international crimes. International criminal 
tribunals have recognized that guilty pleas contribute to the establishment of the 
truth. Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the substantial weight that guilty pleas 
carry in mitigation.216 When defendants plead guilty, they may reveal inside 
information that would otherwise not surface during a trial—for example, how a 
leadership structure worked or why certain crimes were committed. By accepting 
responsibility, defendants can also help prevent inaccurate revisionist accounts of 
history.217 Once political and military leaders admit their guilt openly in court, 
“[d]enial of the commission of the crime may no longer be an option for those 
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who have convinced themselves that the Tribunal is biased or that its judgements 
[sic] are based on weak or even false evidence.”218 
Prosecutors and courts must nonetheless remain aware of the risk that plea 
bargains could undermine the goal of compiling a precise record by omitting 
facts and failing to test them rigorously through an adversarial procedure. It is 
always possible that “[n]either the public, nor the judges themselves [will] come 
closer to know the truth beyond what is accepted in the plea agreement.”219 
Charge bargains are especially problematic in this respect: 
If the Prosecutor makes a plea agreement such that the totality of an 
individual’s criminal conduct is not reflected or the remaining charges do 
not sufficiently reflect the gravity of offenses committed by the accused, 
questions will inevitably arise as to whether justice is in fact being done. 
The public may be left to wonder about the motives for guilty pleas, 
whether the conviction in fact reflects the full criminal conduct of the 
accused and whether it establishes a credible and complete historical 
record.220 
As the Momir Nikolić Trial Chamber emphasized, it is especially important 
for international courts to supervise charge bargains and ensure that important 
facts are not omitted or distorted in the effort to resolve a case consensually.221 
The stricter oversight of charge bargains is consistent with civil law approaches 
to criminal procedure, and more importantly, with the international criminal 
courts’ goal to establish the truth and provide an accurate record of the crimes. 
In summary, the propriety of plea bargaining at international criminal courts 
continues to be debated and depends greatly on the form that the practice takes. 
Certain types of plea bargains may interfere with victims’ interests and with the 
truth-seeking, retributive, and deterrent goals of the courts. Others may advance 
these goals, or at the very least avoid conflicting with them. To maximize the 
value of plea bargains, courts must consider their design carefully. 
In this respect, the ICC Statute is an advancement over the ICTY and ICTR 
Rules on plea bargaining. The ICC Statute emphasizes the importance of 
gathering ample facts to support an admission of guilt and the duty of judges to 
review the facts independently. This approach strengthens the historical record 
that plea bargains produce and enhances the fairness of plea bargaining to 
defendants and victims. The ICC expressly entrusts judges with the responsibility 
of ensuring that plea bargains are consistent with the interests of justice and of 
victims. It also provides for the possibility of victim participation at the 
proceedings on admission of guilt, and allows them to make their views on 
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particular plea bargains known. Finally, the ICC provides that an admission of 
guilt may be tendered only after consultation with defense counsel, thus 
increasing the likelihood that the admission will be voluntary and informed. 
The ICC’s approach to plea bargaining therefore has great potential to 
advance the court’s broader goals. As noted earlier, the court is set to receive its 
first guilty plea later this year from Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, to the war crime of 
“attacking buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments.”222 The 
defendant is expected to admit openly to his crimes and to express remorse for 
them. The court’s approach to this guilty plea will set an important precedent for 
the future course of plea bargaining at the ICC. 
As the ICC considers the place that plea bargaining can have in its 
proceedings, it ought to consider other critical questions concerning guilty pleas 
that have arisen at the international criminal tribunals and in some domestic 
systems. For example, the ICC may wish to elaborate on the voluntariness 
standard and furnish examples of the kinds of pressure that may render a guilty 
plea involuntary. It is important to resolve whether threats of substantially greater 
punishment or promises of extraordinary lenient sentences might render guilty 
pleas involuntary. If the answer is yes, then the ICC ought to take steps to 
prevent such involuntary pleas (for example, by setting a fixed ceiling on plea 
discounts and by strictly supervising charge bargains). 
It would also be helpful for the ICC to apply a presumption that defendants 
have to accept responsibility for their actions in order to receive a sentencing 
reduction. Guilty pleas should be unequivocal to be valid, as the Rules of the 
ICTY and ICTR provide. In addition, before awarding any significant sentencing 
discounts, ICC judges may require evidence of remorse that goes beyond mere 
statements and includes actions that suggest contrition. Such a requirement can 
help ensure that guilty pleas, even when accompanied by significant sentencing 
discounts, still contribute to reconciliation in the region affected by the crimes in 
question. 
Finally, judges ought to actively use the tools provided by the ICC Statute 
and call for additional presentation of evidence when reviewing admissions of 
guilt. This practice would enhance the contribution of admissions of guilt to the 
discovery of the truth and the presentation of an accurate record, which remains a 
central goal of international criminal courts. Considering approaches such as 
these should encourage policymakers to rethink the role of plea bargaining in 
international criminal law and design procedures that are fair, efficient, and 
consistent with the goals of international criminal justice. 
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